Can a Man Who Lives With a Woman Get Money For Improvements Made to Property She Owns?

Full question:

My ex 'fiance' is suing me for $85,000 after a breakup where we co-habited for 7 years in MD. The night before we were to buy the house together he backed out and I bought it myself. He paid me $500 a month toward living expenses since I paid for gas, electric, cable, telephone, food, property taxes, etc. Can he possible win? He is suing for 'improvements to the house'....There was no contract.

• Category: Cohabitation
• Date: 04/07/2025
• State: Maryland

Answer:

Generally, unmarried cohabitants do not enjoy the same rights as married individuals, particularly with respect to property acquired during a relationship. Marital property laws and other family laws related to marriage do not apply to unmarried couples, even in long-term relationships. The characterization of property acquired by unmarried cohabitants is less clear than that of married couples whose ownership of property is governed by marital and community property laws. Some property acquired by unmarried couples may be owned jointly, but it may be difficult to divide such property when the relationship ends.

Cohabitation is generally defined as two people living together as if a married couple. State laws vary in defining cohabitation. Some states have statutes which make cohabitation a criminal offense under adultery laws. Under one state's law, cohabitation means "regularly residing with an adult of the same or opposite sex, if the parties hold themselves out as a couple, and regardless of whether the relationship confers a financial benefit on the party receiving alimony. Proof of sexual relations is admissible but not required to prove cohabitation." Another state statute defines cohabitation as "the dwelling together continuously and habitually of a man and a woman who are in a private conjugal relationship not solemnized as a marriage according to law, or not necessarily meeting all the standards of a common-law marriage." Yet another state, Georgia, defines cohabitation as "dwelling together continuously and openly in a meretricious relationship with another person, regardless of the sex of the other person."

Living together, or cohabitation, in a non-marital relationship does not automatically entitle either party to acquire any rights in the property of the other party acquired during the period of cohabitation. However, adults who voluntarily live together and engage in sexual relations may enter into a contract to establish the respective rights and duties of the parties with respect to their earnings and the property acquired from their earnings during the nonmarital relationship. While parties to a nonmarital cohabitation agreement cannot lawfully contract to pay for the performance of sexual services, they may agree to pool their earnings and hold all property acquired during the relationship separately, jointly or to be governed by community property laws. They may also agree to pool only part of their earnings and property, form a partnership or joint venture or joint enterprise, or hold property as joint tenants or tenants in common, or agree to any other arrangement.

Other legal issues that may be affect cohabiting couples inlude estate planning and medical care. Generally, someone who cohabits with another is not considered an heir under the law or have the same rights to make medical care decisions in the same manner as a spouse. Therefore, unmarried cohabitants may consider estate planning and power of attorneys in addition to having a nonmarital agreement.

In some cases of people who formerly cohabited, courts have found a trust created in property of one person who cohabits with another, whereby the property is deemed held for the benefit of their domestic partner. When there is no formal trust agreement, a resulting trust may still be found under certain circumstances in order to enforce agreements regarding the property and income of domestic partners. If there is evidence that the parties intended to create a trust, but the formalities of a trust are lacking, the court may declare a resulting trust exists. The court may also declare that a constructive trust exists, which is essentially a legal fiction designed to avoid injustice and prevent giving an unfair advantage to one of the parties. This may be based on the contributions made by one partner to the property of the other. Each case is decided on its own facts, taking all circumstances into consideration.

A minority of states have anti-cohabitation laws on their books, although they are largely not enforced. State laws also exist allowing cohabitation as affirmative defense in certain criminal sexual offenses. Cohabitation alone may not qualify as common law marriage. Under the terms of an alimony order, payments may cease if the recipient cohabits with another. Some state statutes and case law allow modification or termination of alimony based upon a significant change of circumstances, such as cohabitation. State laws involving cohabitation vary by state, so local laws should be consulted for requirements and applicablilty in your area.

Jared Laskin, a prominent “palimony” lawyer in California has written an online article about palimony since the 1976 decision of Marvin v. Marvin; see: http://www.palimony.com/7.html. Reading that article will give some notion of the rights of a cohabitant whose domestic partnership is not working.

It is recommended for cohabiting couples to create a cohabitation agreement, which can be enforced under contract law principles. Such agreements provide for the terms of dividing assets and debts upon termination of the relationship. Please see the links to the forms below.

A resulting trust is a trust created in property of one person who cohabits with another, whereby the property is deemed held for the benefit of their domestic partner. When there is no formal trust agreement, a resulting trust may still be found under certain circumstances in order to enforce agreements regarding the property and income of domestic partners. If there is evidence that the parties intended to create a trust, but the formalities of a trust are lacking, the court may find a resulting trust exists.

The court may also declare that a constructive trust exists, which is essentially a legal fiction designed to avoid injustice and prevent giving an unfair advantage to one of the parties. This may be based on the contributions made by one partner to the property of the other. The court typically requires a finding of unjust enrichment before it wil impose a constructive trust. Each case is decided on its own facts, taking all circumstances into consideration.

The doctrine of unjust enrichment is based upon the principle that one should not be permitted unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of another but should be required to make restitution of or for property received, retained or appropriated. The general rule is that a payment of money under a mistake of fact may be recovered provided that such payment will not prejudice the payee. It is considered unjust enrichment to permit a recipient to retain money paid because of a mistake, unless the circumstances are such that it would be inequitable to require its return. This applies even if the mistake is one on one side (unilateral) and a consequence of the payors negligence, or that the payee acted in good faith. "A person who has conferred a benefit on another by mistake is not precluded from maintaining an action for restitution by the fact that the mistake was due to his lack of care." (Restatement of Restitution § 59.) Equity, which is based on notions of fairness, often allows a person who pays money to another under the mistaken belief a valid contract exists to recover that money when the contract is subsequently canceled for fraud or mistake and the rights of innocent parties have not intervened. (Restatement of Restitution §§ 17, 28.)

A constructive trust is one that arises by operation of law against one who, by fraud, wrongdoing, or any other unconscionable conduct, either has obtained or holds legal right to property which he ought not to, in good conscience, keep and enjoy. A constructive trust is an appropriate remedy against unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment is present in nearly every case where a constructive trust is imposed. However, the court's creation of a constructive trust is not necessarily dependent on a finding that the person whose property is subjected to it has acted wrongly, but may rest as well upon a finding of unjust enrichment arising from other circumstances that "render it inequitable for the party holding the title to retain it." (Starleper v. Hamilton 106 Md.App. 632, 666 A.2d 867 (1995).)

The basis for creating a constructive trust is to prevent unjust enrichment. (Restatement of Restitution § 160, comment c.) "Where a person wrongfully disposes of property of another knowing that the disposition is wrongful and acquires in exchange other property, the other is entitled to enforce a constructive trust of the property so acquired." If the property so acquired is or becomes more valuable than the property used in acquiring it, the profit thus made by the wrongdoer cannot be retained by him; the person whose property was used in making the profit is entitled to it." (Restatement Restitution § 202.) When property is given or devised to a defendant in breach of a donor's or testator's contract with a plaintiff, equity will impose a constructive trust upon that property being held by another even though (1) the transfer is not the result of breach of a fiduciary duty or an actual or constructive fraud practiced upon the plaintiff, and (2) the donee or devisee had no knowledge of the wrongdoing or breach of contract. (Jones v. Harrison , 250 Va. 64, 458 S.E.2d 766 (1995 ).)

A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another may be required to make restitution to the other. Despite not having a contractual agreement, a trial court may require an individual to make restitution for unjust enrichment if he has received a benefit which would be unconscionable to retain. A person may be deemed to be unjustly enriched if he (or she) has received a benefit, and keeping it would create injustice.

Please see the following MD cases:

 

WIMMER v. WIMMER, 287 Md. 663 (1980)
414 A.2d 1254
CECIL M. WIMMER v. ANNIE LOUISE WIMMER
[No. 56, September Term, 1979.]
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Decided June 4, 1980.

HUSBAND AND WIFE — Absent Statute, Court Lacks Power To
Transfer Property Of Either Spouse To Other Or To Change Parties'
Rights Or Estates In That Property. p. 667

EQUITY — Constructive Trust — Remedy Applied To Prevent Fraud,
Misrepresentation Or Other Improper Action — Imposition Of
Constructive Trust Prevents Unjust Enrichment By Converting
Holder Of Legal Title To Property Into Trustee For One Equitably
Entitled To Beneficial Interest — Where Confidential Relationship
Exists, Dominant Party Has Burden To Show Fairness And
Reasonableness Of Transaction By Which He Acquired Property In
Which Another Has Equitable Interest. pp. 667-674

HUSBAND AND WIFE — Constructive Trust — Marital Relationship
Or Nonmonetary Contributions Of Spouse To Other's Property Is
Inadequate To Support Imposition Of Constructive Trust. Where a
husband purchased marital home with his own funds and titled it
in his name alone, and where husband subsequently mortgaged home
and forced wife to sign mortgage note, but used the mortgage
proceeds to purchase property titled in names of husband and
wife, the Court held that there was no evidence of fraud,
misrepresentation or unjust enrichment on the part of the husband
that would justify the imposition of a constructive trust on
property titled in his name alone. The Court held, further,
that the spousal relationship, in and of itself, gives rise to no
marital interest in the property of one spouse as against the
other and is inadequate to support the imposition of a
constructive trust. pp. 667-674

J.A.A.

Certiorari to the Court of Special Appeals. (Circuit Court for
Prince George's County, Blackwell, J.).

Equity action by Annie Louise Wimmer against Cecil M. Wimmer to
impose a constructive trust on the marital home titled in the
defendant's name. From a decree imposing a constructive trust as
to one-half interest, Cecil M. Wimmer
Page 664
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed in an
unreported opinion. Wimmer v. Wimmer, No. 993, September Term,
1978, filed May 10, 1979. The Court granted the petition for
certiorari of Cecil M. Wimmer.

Judgment of the Court of Special Appeals reversed. Case
remanded to that court with instructions to reverse the judgment
of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. Appellee to pay
the costs.

The cause was argued before SMITH, DIGGES, ELDRIDGE, ORTH, COLE
and DAVIDSON, JJ.

Henry A. Babcock for appellant.

Arnold D. Bruckner for appellee.

COLE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

We are asked to decide, under the circumstances of this case,
whether a constructive trust may be impressed upon a one-half
interest in real property which constituted the marital domicile
of the parties, where the funds to purchase said property
resulted solely from the husband's labors and where the wife's
contribution to the marriage was solely that of a wife and
mother.

Cecil and Annie Wimmer were married in 1940 and divorced in
1977. During their marriage Cecil was the breadwinner; Annie was
the homemaker. He always worked; she never did except for a short
period as a babysitter for her daughter. Cecil demonstrated
unique business acumen in light of his 4th grade education;
Annie, with a 7th grade education, could hardly read and write
and depended upon Cecil and her children to explain simple
business and financial matters.

Cecil was a carpenter by trade and specialized in buying,
remodeling and selling old houses. In order to obtain the
necessary funds to carry out his business, Cecil would oft times
find it necessary to borrow money, securing the loans by mortgage
notes. Although many of the properties were in his name only,
Cecil frequently obtained his wife's signature on these notes.
Page 665

The marital home which is the subject of this dispute was
purchased by Cecil in 1968 or 1969 and titled in his name alone.
Several years after purchasing this house, Cecil borrowed
$22,400.00 and secured this loan by granting a mortgage on the
house. Annie did not want to sign the mortgage note but Cecil
twisted her arm and struck her on the back of the neck thereby
forcing her to sign same.

On the trial Annie testified that during the marriage she
thought the subject property had been titled in the joint names
of the parties; however, the record does not reveal the basis for
her conclusion. Annie also testified that Cecil had used the
proceeds of the mortgage loan to purchase houses in his name
alone; Cecil contended and produced documentary evidence to
establish that the funds were used toward the purchase of
property titled in both their names.

The parties separated in 1974. Annie, who remained in the
marital home, assumed the mortgage payments but paid no rent to
Cecil. The parties were divorced a vinculo matrimonii in 1977
and all questions relating to property remained unresolved.
Thereafter, Annie filed a bill of complaint in the Circuit Court
for Prince George's County against Cecil seeking to have the
court impress a constructive trust on several properties titled
in Cecil's name.[fn1] The circuit court dismissed the actions
against all properties except the marital home upon which the
court impressed a constructive trust as to one-half interest. The
circuit court found that a confidential relationship existed
between the parties and that Cecil was the dominant party. The
court further found that Cecil failed to meet the burden imposed
upon the dominant party of showing the fairness and
reasonableness in the questioned transactions. The court
concluded that:

Mrs. Wimmer had a marital interest in the property,
because of many factors, some of which
Page 666
are the fact that they had been married 37 years;
that they raised a family; that her efforts had gone
into maintenance of the family and education of the
children, feeding, clothing and keeping the house
clean, and while she worked only a minimal amount and
what monies she did earn could not be traced directly
to the purchase of 5007, that she, obviously, had a
marital interest in it; and, consequently, the Court
concludes that a constructive trust had been shown to
exist, as far as that property is concerned.
[emphasis added].

From this decree, Cecil appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.
That court in an unreported opinion affirmed. Cecil M. Wimmer v.
Annie Louise Wimmer, No. 993, September Term, 1978, filed May
10, 1979. We granted Cecil's petition for certiorari.

Before us Cecil concedes the existence of a confidential
relationship, but contends that there is no evidence of fraud,
undue influence, or unfair advantage by which he profited. With
respect to the purchase of the marital home, Cecil notes that the
dwelling was purchased with his own funds; that Annie suffered no
loss; and that he did not profit from her. Regarding the
encumbrance, Cecil asserts that there is no law to support a
theory that because Annie unwillingly signed the mortgage note on
his property, some legal right was created in the property to her
benefit. In addition Cecil declares that because the proceeds of
the loan transaction were used to purchase a property titled in
both their names, Annie actually benefitted. Hence, there is no
unjust enrichment.

Annie maintains that there was fraud involved here in Cecil's
continuous representations over the years that he was putting all
of the properties in both of their names. In addition, Annie
contends that there is present in this case the potential for the
unjust enrichment of Cecil and for her financial suffering. By
signing the mortgage notes, she contends that she has subjected
herself to the possibility of financial ruin. Finally, Annie
asserts that a constructive
Page 667
trust may be imposed purely on the basis of equity and that the
facts here warrant such imposition.

Annie's theory finds support in some states which hold that
upon granting a divorce, the chancellor has the power to make an
equitable distribution of property without regard to title. See
Freed and Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as of
August 1, 1978 [1978] 4 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 4033, 4037. However,
this Court has repeatedly said that in the absence of statute the
courts of this State are without power to transfer the property
of either spouse to the other or to change the parties' rights or
estates in that property, notwithstanding a wife's nonmonetary
contributions to the marriage. Bender v. Bender, 282 Md. 525,
534, 386 A.2d 772 (1978);[fn2] Gebhard v. Gebhard, 253 Md. 125,
252 A.2d 171 (1969); Lopez v. Lopez, 206 Md. 509, 112 A.2d 466
(1955); Dougherty v. Dougherty, 187 Md. 21, 48 A.2d 451 (1946).

Despite the lack of power to transfer the ownership of property
from one spouse to the other, a court will, given the proper
circumstances, impose a constructive trust thereby transferring
the beneficial or equitable interest to the deserving party.
Having no claim to the legal title in the marital home, Annie has
sought redress for the alleged misrepresentations of Cecil and
compensation for her nonmonetary contributions to the marriage by
requesting the imposition of a constructive trust in her favor.

In granting Annie's request for a constructive trust on the
marital dwelling, the chancellor did not base his decision upon
proof of wrongdoing by Cecil. Rather, he found that
Page 668
Cecil had failed to meet his burden of proving fairness in the
context of a confidential relationship with respect to property
in which Annie had an interest — that interest being merely what
the chancellor termed a "marital interest." It was apparently the
chancellor's view that the court could base the imposition of a
constructive trust upon a spouse's nonmonetary contributions to
the marriage.

In determining whether the chancellor was correct in his
conclusion, we shall decide whether the facts of this case
relating to a mortgage transaction warrant the imposition of a
constructive trust and whether the chancellor was correct in
basing his decision in part on what he termed Annie's marital
interest in Cecil's property.

A constructive trust is the remedy employed by a court of
equity to convert the holder of the legal title to property into
a trustee for one who in good conscience should reap the benefits
of the possession of said property. The remedy is applied by
operation of law where property has been acquired by fraud,
misrepresentation, or other improper method, or where the
circumstances render it inequitable for the party holding the
title to retain it. Bowie v. Ford, 269 Md. 111, 304 A.2d 803
(1973); O'Connor v. Estevez, 182 Md. 541, 35 A.2d 148 (1943);
Springer v. Springer, 144 Md. 465, 125 A. 162 (1924). The
purpose of the remedy is to prevent the unjust enrichment of the
holder of the property. Siemiesz v. Amend, 237 Md. 438,
206 A.2d 723 (1965).

In the ordinary case, there must be clear and convincing
evidence not only of wrongdoing, but also of the circumstances
which render it inequitable for the holder of the legal title to
retain the beneficial interest. Peninsula Meth. Homes v.
Cropper, 256 Md. 728, 261 A.2d 787 (1970). However, where a
confidential relationship exists, the rules are somewhat
different. In the context of the law of constructive trusts, a
confidential relationship "exists where one party is under the
domination of another, or where, under the circumstances, such
party is justified in assuming that the other will not act in a
manner inconsistent with his or her welfare." Bass v. Smith,
189 Md. 461, 469, 56 A.2d 800 (1948). A confidential relationship
will not be presumed
Page 669
from a marital relationship, but must be established by
convincing evidence. Fant v. Duffy, 232 Md. 481, 192 A.2d 293
(1963); Bell v. Bell, 38 Md. App. 10, 379 A.2d 419 (1977). Once
a confidential relationship is shown, a presumption arises that
confidence was placed in the dominant party and that the
transaction complained of resulted from fraud or undue influence
and superiority or abuse of the confidential relationship by
which the dominant party profited. Wenger v. Rosinsky,
232 Md. 43, 192 A.2d 82 (1963); 21 M.L.E. Trusts § 67 (1962). This
presumption shifts the burden to the defendant to show the
fairness and reasonableness of the transaction. Sanders v.
Sanders, 261 Md. 268, 276, 274 A.2d 383 (1971). The defendant's
evidence must be clear, satisfactory, and convincing to overcome
the presumption. Rice v. Rice, 184 Md. 403, 411-12, 41 A.2d 371
(1945).

In those cases in which this Court has approved the imposition
of a constructive trust there has been some transaction in which
the alleged wrongdoer has acquired property in violation of some
agreement or in which another person had some good equitable
claim of entitlement to property resulting from the expenditure
of funds or other detrimental reliance resulting in unjust
enrichment.

For example, in Springer v. Springer, supra, a father
negotiated for and purchased the property in question for the
benefit of his family. Because the father was ill, legal title
was placed in the name of a son with the understanding that the
son would hold it for the benefit of the family. Having obtained
the legal title, the son asserted that the property was purchased
for him. This Court affirmed the imposition of a constructive
trust on behalf of the father holding that where one violates a
parol agreement to hold property for the benefit of another and
the latter was under the circumstances justified in his belief
that the former would carry out the agreement, such violation may
be sufficient to raise a constructive trust in favor of the
promisee. Like Springer, each of the following cases involved a
breach of some parol agreement whereby one party acquired and
then inequitably held property resulting in his unjust
enrichment. Dove v. White, 211 Md. 228, 126 A.2d 835
Page 670
(1956); Carter v. Abramo, 201 Md. 339, 93 A.2d 546 (1953);
Shives v. Borgman, 194 Md. 29, 69 A.2d 802 (1949); Long v.
Huseman, 186 Md. 495, 47 A.2d 75 (1946); Trossbach v.
Trossbach, 185 Md. 47, 42 A.2d 905 (1945); O'Connor v. Estevez,
supra; Byer v. Szandrowski, 160 Md. 212, 153 A. 49 (1931);
Dillfelder v. Winterling, 150 Md. 626, 133 A. 825 (1926);
Jasinki v. Stankowski, 145 Md. 58, 125 A. 684 (1924); Ruhe v.
Ruhe, 113 Md. 595, 77 A. 797 (1910).

Unlike the above cases, Wenger v. Rosinsky, supra, did not
involve a parol agreement. Here, the Court found that a landlady
had failed to meet her burden of showing the fairness and
reasonableness of the transaction where she had prevailed upon
her boarder, a retired marine sergeant, to transfer most of his
funds to her or for her benefit. In Blondell v. Turover,
195 Md. 251, 72 A.2d 697 (1950), the Court imposed a constructive
trust on one who acquired property by purchasing it despite his
knowledge that the sale was in breach of an option contract in
favor of another. A more recent case was Shaffer v. Lohr,
264 Md. 397, 287 A.2d 42 (1972). There a daughter, at the death of
her mother, took possession of funds in a savings account titled
in both their names. Finding that the funds should have been part
of the mother's estate, the Court impressed a constructive trust
on behalf of the other daughter. The first daughter was said to
have a duty to convey to prevent her own unjust enrichment.

In contrast to the cases cited above is Wooddy v. Wooddy,
258 Md. 224, 265 A.2d 467 (1970). A constructive trust was sought
against a father's life insurance policies as a means of
enforcing the father's legal obligation to pay for the education
of his children. This Court held that a constructive trust was
not a permissible remedy on these facts. The crucial language of
the Court was the following:

But the availability of this remedy is limited to
instances where property is acquired by fraud,
misrepresentation, duress, or under some other
circumstance which makes it inequitable for the
person holding title to retain it against another.
In
Page 671
the usual case, the person seeking to subject
property to a constructive trust has at some time
owned it, or had a valid claim to or against it.
Here, the insurance policies were solely Dr.
Wooddy's, and the fact that he may at one time have
designated the children as beneficiaries or intended
the policies to be used for their education does not,
standing alone, create rights which may be asserted
by the children or in their behalf to require him to
keep the policies in force or to prevent him from
changing the beneficiary he had designated. [258 Md.
at 233 (emphasis added)].

Clearly then in most cases, unless there is an acquisition of
property in which another has some good equitable claim, no
constructive trust may be imposed. A rule without such
limitations would permit the courts to effectively transfer
property as a means of attempting to right every wrong. The
courts' equitable powers are not so broad.

Applying these principles to the facts of this case compels the
conclusion that this is not a proper case for the imposition of a
constructive trust. While the parties agree that there is a
confidential relationship and that Cecil is the dominant party,
unless there was some transaction by which Cecil acquired some
property in which Annie has some bona fide equitable claim, then
the trial court erred in shifting the burden to Cecil to prove
the fairness and reasonableness of his actions. We are unable to
say that this case clearly involves any transaction cognizable
for purposes of the law of constructive trusts. With respect to
the purchase of the marital home, despite Annie's assertions to
the contrary, there is no evidence in the record of any
misrepresentations by Cecil as to the title of the property.
There are no facts sufficient to explain the basis for Annie's
belief or understanding that the property was titled in both
names.[fn3]
Page 672
Moreover, even if there had been a misrepresentation to that
effect by Cecil, there was no detrimental reliance by Annie. She
neither transferred any funds nor parted with any other property
in reliance thereon. In addition, as the house was purchased with
Cecil's funds, missing is the indispensable element of unjust
enrichment.

Nor do the circumstances surrounding the obtainment of the
mortgage amount to a transaction cognizable for purposes of
applying the law of constructive trusts. Annie can point to no
property in which she had a claim which Cecil acquired as a
result of obtaining the mortgage. While it may be argued that
Cecil's reprehensible conduct in inducing Annie to sign the
mortgage note resulted in her incurring a liability through his
abuse of a confidential relationship and, even if it could be
said that such facts constituted the kind of transaction which
could potentially support the imposition of a constructive trust,
Annie would not be entitled to relief. Again missing is the
requisite element of unjust enrichment. In fact, it appears that
Annie benefitted by the transaction. The conclusion, we infer
from the findings of fact by the chancellor, was that the
proceeds of the loan were used to purchase property, the title to
which was placed in both their names. Annie, therefore, profited
by the transactions.

The weakness in Annie's position and the error of the courts
below can be illuminated by a comparison with cases from other
jurisdictions in which courts have imposed a constructive trust
in the marital abode. A very recent case is Tomaino v. Tomaino,
68 A.D.2d 267, 416 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1979), where the husband
misled his wife by informing her that there was no need for her
name to be on the deed because New York was a community property
state. He also induced her to transfer money to him for
improvements on
Page 673
the property. Finding that a statement had been made in the
context of a confidential relationship upon which the wife relied
and the transfer of funds resulting in the husband's unjust
enrichment, the court applied a constructive trust.

In Genter v. Genter, 270 So.2d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972), the parties, prior to their marriage, borrowed money from
the wife's grandmother which was used toward the downpayment on a
home. Although the home was placed in the husband's name, there
was an understanding that the wife could have an interest in it.
In addition, the wife often worked in the husband's business
without pay. The court found that the transfer of funds combined
with the express parol agreement and unjust enrichment warranted
the imposition of a constructive trust.

Although it involved the marital farm as well as the house,
Cline v. Cline, 297 N.C. 336, 255 S.E.2d 399 (1979), is also
instructive. After representing to his wife that the farm would
be held jointly and that the obligation to pay off the mortgage
would be their joint liability, the husband took title in his own
name. The court found that in accordance with the understanding,
the wife contributed money and labor in an amount equal to
one-half the value of the mortgage. It therefore imposed a
constructive trust.

All three of the above cases clearly involve factors not
present in this case. Stripped of the elements of wrongdoing,
property transfer, and tangible unjust enrichment, Annie's claim
is reduced to her contention that she is entitled to part of
Cecil's property merely by virtue of their marriage. This
according to her own testimony was the real basis of her case:

Q. So when Cecil purchased these houses in his own
name, you were no worse off than you were before.
Had you suffered anything by his buying the houses
in his own name?

* * *

A. I don't think I suffered, but I feel that I am
entitled to what belongs to him.
Page 674

While the imposition of a constructive trust is a remedy which
may be applied to correct a broad spectrum of inequitable
conduct, it is not however, a remedy for every moral wrong
arising in societal affairs. A court of equity will not deprive
one person of property titled in his name and give it to another
merely because the latter believes herself to be deserving of it.
We hold that the relationship of husband and wife, in and of
itself, gives rise to no marital interest in the property of one
spouse as against the other and is inadequate to support the
imposition of a constructive trust.

The chancellor's imposition of a constructive trust in the case
at bar was erroneous and we, therefore, reverse.

Judgment of the Court of Special Appeals reversed and case
remanded to that court with instructions to reverse the judgment
of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County; appellee to pay
the costs.

[fn1] At the time the parties separated, Cecil owned seven rental
properties and the home of the parties. Four of the properties
were titled in their joint names; Annie filed suit to impress a
trust on the four properties in his name alone.

[fn2] The holding in Bender v. Bender, 282 Md. 525, 534,
386 A.2d 772 (1978) is not a departure from this rule. Bender merely
raises a presumption to aid the court in determining the
ownership of household goods and furnishings. There is no
statutory authority permitting the court to determine the
ownership of real property, (title apparently being dispositive
in most cases). Similarly, Maryland's new property disposition
statute, Maryland Code (1974, 1979 Supp.), §§ 3-6A-01
through 3-6A-07 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article, does not permit the court to transfer the ownership
of either real or personal property from one spouse to the other. §§
3-6A-03 and 3-6A-04. The statute does however, permit
the court to make an award of money in lieu thereof and to do so
in accordance with the announced policy of the legislature which
is to give careful consideration to both monetary and nonmonetary
contributions by the spouses to the marriage. This statute is of
no aid to Annie for it applies only to cases filed after January
1, 1979.

[fn3] Annie would also have us consider her assumption of the
mortgage payments as evidence that there was an understanding
that she would have an interest in the house. Ordinarily, a
constructive trust must be established from circumstances
surrounding the inception of the transaction and not from
subsequent events. Annapolis v. W. Anna. Fire & Imp. Co.,
264 Md. 729, 737, 288 A.2d 151 (1972). Subsequent conduct is only
relevant to the extent that it reflects upon the intention or
purpose of the person sought to be charged at the time the
transaction was consummated. Corbett v. Hospelhorn, 172 Md. 257,
191 A. 691 (1937). Annie's assumption of the mortgage does little
to support her theory that the parties intended the property to
be jointly owned particularly in light of the fact that the
assumption appears to be in lieu of rental payments to Cecil.

JAHNIGEN v. SMITH, 143 Md. App. 547 (2002)
795 A.2d 234
PHILIP JAHNIGEN v. MARY ROSALIE SMITH
No. 852, September Term, 2001
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
Filed: April 2, 2002

The Court of Special Appeals, Greene, J.
Page 548

Reversed and remanded.
Page 549

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN
OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.]
Page 550

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN
OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.]
Page 551

Daniel Scherr (Reese and Carney, LLP on the brief), Columbia, for
appellant.

Bryan A. Bishop (Bishop, Danerman, Reiff & Simpson, LLC on the brief),
Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued Before JAMES R. EYLER, GREENE, LAWRENCE F. RODOWSKY (Ret'd,
Specially Assigned) JJ.

GREENE, Judge.

On November 6, 2000, Philip Jahnigen, appellant, filed a
complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County against Mary
Rosalie Smith, appellee, seeking to impose a constructive trust
for the benefit of Jahnigen on certain real property titled in
Smith's name. Jahnigen claims a beneficial one-half interest as a
tenant in common with Smith with respect to the property in
question. Jahnigen sought an order requiring Smith to convey to
him record title to a one-half interest in the property. On
November 14, 2000, Jahnigen filed an Amended Complaint for the
purpose of adding the deed to the property as an exhibit. The
amended complaint served to accurately describe the property, but
restated the same arguments.

On December 18, 2000, Smith answered the Amended Complaint
and on February 7, 2001, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds
of res judicata and laches. The motion included as exhibits
documents copied from the files of a 1994 action in the District
Court of Maryland for Baltimore County, including,
Page 552
inter alia, a Complaint and Summons in Case No. 2569-94 and a
Petition For Warrant of Restitution in the same action.

On April 30, 2001, the parties argued the motion before the
circuit court. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ruled
that Jahnigen's equitable claims were barred by laches, applying
the three-year statute of limitations which the court determined
was the appropriate analogous statute. On May 2, 2001, the
circuit court entered its order dismissing the action with
prejudice.

On May 9, 2001, Jahnigen filed a Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment and Request for Hearing. Accompanying the Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment was an affidavit of Jahnigen supplementing
the factual allegations of the Amended Complaint. The motion was
denied on June 7, 2001 without a hearing.

Jahnigen subsequently brought this appeal to present the
following questions for our review, which we have rephrased:

I. Did the circuit court err in dismissing appellant's
Amended Complaint with prejudice under the three-year
statute of limitations when appellant's claim was for
the recovery of possession of his property?

II. Did the circuit court err in dismissing appellant's
Amended Complaint with prejudice under the three-year
statute of limitations when appellant's claim was for
the recovery of possession of his property, and a cause
of action did not accrue until appellant actually lost
possession of the property?

III. Did the circuit court err in concluding that appellant
was placed on notice of a challenge to his claim of
ownership by the district court action in 1994, thus
commencing the running of the statute of limitations?

IV. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying
appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment without a
hearing to consider the supplementary facts and argument
regarding the accrual of the cause of action, notice,
and the applicable analogous statute of limitations?
Page 553

With regard to the first question presented, the circuit
court erred in concluding a three-year statute of limitations was
appropriate for applying a defense of laches. We further conclude
that the analogous statute of limitations of twenty years did not
begin to run until appellee made a clear repudiation of the
agreement. Our disposition as to the first two issues makes
resolution of the remaining questions unnecessary.

Facts

Philip Jahnigen and Mary Rosalie Smith were friends and
business associates. In April 1975, real property known as 1300
North Avenue, Arbutus, Maryland was purchased in the name of
Smith. The property contained two apartments and it was agreed
between the parties that Jahnigen would live in the bottom
apartment, manage the property, and receive the rental income
generated from the other apartment. Jahnigen used that rental
income to pay the mortgage and repair costs.

In April 1994, Smith filed an action in district court to
gain possession of the property from Jahnigen. This case was
dismissed because Smith's request for a postponement of the
hearing was denied, and she did not appear for the hearing.

Subsequently, on August 17, 1994, Smith filed a second action
against Jahnigen as a tenant holding over. A trial was held
before the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore County on
September 1, 1994. At the close of trial, the court granted
Smith's petition for a Warrant of Restitution. On November 17,
1994, however, Smith cancelled the Warrant and Jahnigen remained
on the premises.

Again in June 2000, Smith filed a Wrongful Detainer action
against Jahnigen in the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore
County. At the hearing on the matter, Jahnigen claimed an
ownership interest in the property, and the action was stayed
pending a determination from the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County regarding ownership. Jahnigen vacated the property
pursuant to an agreement between the parties and filed the
constructive trust action in the circuit court on
Page 554
November 6, 2000. The circuit court determined that Jahnigen's claims were
time barred and subsequently dismissed the action. Thereafter,
Jahnigen noted this appeal.

Discussion

Standard of Review

In analyzing a motion to dismiss, a trial court, assuming the
truth of all well-pleaded facts in the complaint and taking all
inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, must determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Boyd v. Hickman, 114 Md. App. 108,
117, 689 A.2d 106 (1997) (citing Sharrow v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.,
306 Md. 754, 762, 768, 511 A.2d 492 (1986)). Dismissal is only
appropriate where the facts alleged fail to state a cause of action.
Davis v. DiPino, 337 Md. 642, 648, 655 A.2d 401 (1995) (quoting
Decoster v. Westinghouse, 333 Md. 245, 249, 634 A.2d 1330 (1994)).

In the case at bar, appellee supplemented her Motion for
Dismissal with materials from the district court file in the
previous dispute. We have previously noted:

When the circuit court considers matters outside the
pleadings, the court treats the matter as a motion for
summary judgment, and the legal effect of the ruling in favor
of the moving party is to grant a motion for summary
judgment, notwithstanding the ruling as a motion to dismiss.

Boyd, 114 Md. at 117-18, 689 A.2d 106.

Maryland Rule 2-501(e) provides, in relevant part:

The court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the
moving party if the motion and response show that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in
whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must view
the facts, including all inferences, in the light most favorable
to the opposing party. Jones v. Mid-Atlantic
Page 555
Funding Co., 362 Md. 661, 676, 766 A.2d 617 (2001);
Williams v. Mayor & Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 114,
753 A.2d 41 (2000). The standard of appellate review is whether the
trial court was legally correct. Pence v. Norwest Bank Minn., N.A.,
363 Md. 267, 279, 768 A.2d 639 (2001); Hartford Ins. Co. v.
Manor Inn, 335 Md. 135, 144, 642 A.2d 219 (1994); Saponari v.
CSX Transp., Inc., 126 Md. App. 25, 37, 727 A.2d 396 (1998).

I. Statute of Limitations

Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in concluding
that appellant's equitable claim for imposition of a constructive
trust was time barred using a three-year statute of limitations as
guidance. Appellant contends that the action was for the recovery
of a possessory interest in property and as a result a twenty-year
statute of limitations was analogous. Though we do not agree with
appellant's characterization of the action, we concur that the
circuit court erred in assessing a three-year statute of
limitations.

The doctrine of laches is based on the general principles of
estoppel and implies that a plaintiff has exhibited negligence or
lack of due diligence in asserting a right to the detriment of the
defendant. Staley v. Staley, 251 Md. 701, 703,
248 A.2d 655 (1968). In essence, a plaintiff will be estopped from
bringing a claim when the plaintiff has not diligently asserted his
rights in a timely manner and the delay will prejudice or injure the
defendant. Id. The Court of Appeals has further defined laches as

an inexcusable delay, without necessary reference to
duration, in the assertion of a right, and, unless mounting
to the statutory period of limitations, mere delay is not
sufficient to constitute laches, if the delay has not worked
a disadvantage to another.

Bradford v. Futrell, 225 Md. 512, 525, 171 A.2d 493 (1961).

Courts apply laches depending upon the unique circumstances
of each case. Bowie v. Ford, 269 Md. 111, 122, 304 A.2d 803 (1973).
Because the doctrine of laches is tied to the statute of limitations,
"generally the statute applicable to
Page 556
actions at law will be followed by analogy by the equity courts."
Id. at 122-23, 304 A.2d 803 (quoting Hall v. Barlow Corporation,
255 Md. 28, 42, 255 A.2d 873 (1969)). To determine the analogous
statute of limitations, we consider the facts and circumstances of the
case at bar.

Appellant contends that he and appellee had agreed prior to
the purchase of the property in 1975 that it would be initially
titled solely in appellee's name. Appellant further alleges that
appellee agreed to transfer one-half interest in the land to
appellant, thus establishing a tenancy in common, after appellant
resolved certain personal matters. Pursuant to this agreement,
appellant states that the down payment and cost of settlement were
split between the parties. Appellant further notes that he has
periodically reminded appellee of the agreement and that appellee
has always acknowledged her obligation to change the title.
Appellant argues that this agreement was made binding due to a
confidential relationship that existed between the parties. It is
the breach of this relationship upon which appellant bases his
suit.

A constructive trust is an equitable remedy employed to
convert the holder of the legal title to property into a
trustee for one who in good conscience should reap the
benefits of the possession of said property. The remedy is
applied by operation of law where property has been acquired
by fraud, misrepresentation, or other improper method, or
where the circumstances render it inequitable for the party
holding the title to retain it.

Wimmer v. Wimmer, 287 Md. 663, 668, 414 A.2d 1254 (1980) (internal citations
omitted). The remedy is designed to prevent the unjust enrichment
of the holder of the property. Id. (citing Siemiesz v. Amend,
237 Md. 438, 206 A.2d 723 (1965)).

The Court of Appeals in Bowie v. Ford, 269 Md. 111,
304 A.2d 803, was faced with a dispute over real property. The claim
before the Court alleged that the title to the property was obtained by
fraud through a ratified tax sale in 1938.
Page 557
Consequently, if the title was obtained through fraud, then title would be
held in trust for the benefit of those wronged.[fn1] In resolving
the constructive trust issue, the Court was mindful of the doctrine of
laches. The Court concluded that the analogous action at law for
a constructive trust would be an action in ejectment.[fn2]
Bowie, 269 Md. at 123, 304 A.2d 803. Therefore, the Court concluded
that the analogous statute of limitations was twenty years. Id.

The facts as presented do not support an action for a
constructive trust because there has been no allegation of
misrepresentation, fraud, or other improper methods of obtaining
title. Instead, appellant's argument is more analogous to an
action seeking a resulting trust.

Resulting trusts and constructive trusts are both forms of
implied trusts. Resulting trusts arise as a result of the
intentions of the parties as determined by a court.
Page 558

[W]here a transfer of property is made to one person, and
only a part of the purchase price is paid by another, a
resulting trust arises in favor of the person by whom such
payment is made in such proportion as the part paid by him
bears to the total purchase price, unless he manifests an
intention that no resulting trust should arise or that a
resulting trust to that extent should not arise.

Fasaman v. Pottashnick, 188 Md. 105, 109, 51 A.2d 664 (1947); See also Battle
v. Allen, 250 Md. 672, 675, 245 A.2d 590 (1968); Sines v. Shipes,
192 Md. 139, 153, 63 A.2d 748 (1949).

Actions for implied trusts are separate from contract
actions. These claims essentially suggest that despite the lack of
a written agreement, the holder of the property title is
wrongfully possessing the property. The courts can thus conclude
that the property is being held in trust for the benefit of the
complainant. Consequently, actions for "resulting trusts and
constructive trusts are not within the Statute of Frauds, and may
be proved by parol evidence." Fasaman, 188 Md. at 110, 51 A.2d 664.

Appellee claims that an action for a resulting trust is more
analogous to a contract action and thus requires a statute of
limitations of three years. Due to the nature and purpose of the
instant action, we disagree.

In the State of Maryland, it is well settled that proceedings
for the recovery of possession of an interest in real property
carry a statute of limitations of twenty years. See Subers v.
Hurlock, 82 Md. 42, 49, 33 A. 409 (1895). Indeed,
§§ 5-103 CTS. & JUD. PROC. of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code states:

Adverse possession; common-law doctrine of prescription and
other limitations unaffected

(a) In general. — Within 20 years from the date the cause of
action accrues, a person shall:

(1) File an action for recovery of possession of a corporeal
freehold or leasehold estate in land; or

(2) Enter on the land.

Page 559
Md. Code (1973, 1998 Repl. Vol.), §§ 5-103
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

Indeed, as we have noted, the Court of Appeals in Bowie
concluded that a twenty-year statute of limitations applied to a
constructive trust action seeking to recover possession of an
interest in real property. Bowie, 269 Md. at 123, 304 A.2d 803. We
find an action for an implied trust seeking recovery of real property, as
set forth in Bowie, to be more analogous to this case than a
contract action. Thus, we determine that the defense of laches
should have been analyzed using a twenty-year time frame.

Time of Accrual

Having determined that a statute of limitations of twenty
years should apply to the instant case, we are now faced with the
question of when that time began to run. The issue regarding the
running of the statute of limitations for a resulting trust action
is well settled.

Purchase money resulting trusts are □ destructible through
laches of the beneficiary in seeking to enforce his claim,
and through the application of the Statute of Limitations.
As shown elsewhere the Statute runs from the date when the
beneficiary had or should have had, knowledge of the
repudiation of the trust by the trustee.

G. BOGERT, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, § 466 (rev. 2d ed. 1991
Repl. Vol.); See Sines, 192 Md. at 159, 63 A.2d 748 (holding defense
of laches on the basis of prejudice was without merit where repudiation
did not occur until after death of grantor); In Re McGavin,
189 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 1999) (affirming that statute of limitations
did not begin to run on the claims of resulting and constructive
trusts until "an adverse position to any beneficial interest. . .
[was] asserted. . . ."); Walrath v. Roberts, 12 F.2d 443, 446
(D.C.Cal. 1926) (stating that the Statute of Limitations for a resulting
trust action by a trustee is not set in motion until there has
been an unequivocal repudiation).
Page 560

The question of when a repudiation occurred requires the
court to resolve a factual dispute. Though the question of
accrual is a judicial determination, that determination is
dependent on the factual circumstances of the case. Frederick Rd.
Ltd. Pshp. v. Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 76, 95, 756 A.2d 963 (2000)
(stating accrual is a judicial determination whether based solely on law,
solely on fact, or on a combination of law and fact). This, however,
does not mean that a judge, in resolving a dispute through summary
judgment, is able to determine facts in dispute. Grimes v.
Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 366 Md. 29, 73, 782 A.2d 807 (2001);
Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp., 343 Md. 185, 205-06, 680 A.2d 1067 (1996);
Berky v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 304, 413 A.2d 170 (1980). The
material facts underlying Jahnigen's claim of one-half interest as tenant
in common with Smith to the property 1300 North Avenue, Arbutus are in
dispute. Whether there was an oral agreement between the parties with
respect to the purchase and titling of the property in question is in
dispute. The claim that Smith has always acknowledged the obligation to
change title for the benefit of Jahnigen, or that Smith was ever
reminded of the agreement is also contested. Thus, whether the
proceedings initiated by Smith in the District Court of Maryland
and their subsequent termination constituted a repudiation of the
alleged agreement is likewise a matter of dispute. In resolving a
motion for summary judgment, it is not the province of the trial
judge to decide disputed facts. Grimes, 366 Md. at 73, 782 A.2d 807;
Goodwich, 343 Md. at 205-06, 680 A.2d 1067; Berky, 287 Md. at 304,
413 A.2d 170. Therefore, the granting of summary judgment[fn3] and
the subsequent dismissal of the Amended Complaint were inappropriate.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we hold that the circuit
court erred as a matter of law in utilizing a three-year statute
Page 561
of limitations by analogy and therefore erred in dismissing the
Amended Complaint. As a result of these determinations, we need
not address appellant's other questions for review.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY REVERSED.
CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.

COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.

[fn1] Though the original complaint did not allege a
constructive trust was formed, the Court noted:

In reaching this conclusion we are not unmindful of the fact
that these present proceedings originated with a motion under
Rule 625 to set aside an enrolled decretal order of
ratification. But, the law of this state is well settled that
if the specifically requested remedy cannot be granted,
relief suitable to the nature of the case is authorized under
the prayer for general relief, which was included here.

Bowie, 296 Md. at 121-22, 304 A.2d 803.