Full question:
I am a MO parent of a 16 year-old (turns 17 in less than a month) whose behavior is out of control. Can I apply for emancipation of the minor when she turns 17? MO statutes focus on protections for the child. My focus is on protections available to the parent.
- Category: Minors
- Subcategory: Emancipation of Minor
- Date:
- State: Missouri
Answer:
Missouri has no emancipation status other than that which pertains to child support orders. Under current law, there is no general statutory procedure whereby a minor under the age of eighteen can be declared emancipated.
Missouri courts have stated that emancipation occurs when a minor child is freed from the care, custody, control and service of her parents. This is generally accomplished when there is a relinquishment of parental control, the child is given the right to receive and retain her own
earnings, and the parent's legal obligation to support her is terminated. "Emancipation is never presumed, and the burden is upon the party asserting it to show facts proving the emancipation." Randolph v. Randolph, 8 S.W.3d 160, 164 (Mo.App.W.D. 1999). "A minor child may be emancipated in one of three ways: (1) by express parental consent, (2) by implied parental consent, or (3) by a change of the child's status in the eyes of society." Denton v. Sims, 884 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Mo.App.E.D. 1994). The third category usually refers to a child who has married or joined the military. "However, it may also be shown when a child who is physically and mentally able to care for herself voluntarily chooses to leave the parental home and attempts to `fight the battle of life on [her] own account.'" Id. (quoting Specking v. Specking, 528 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Mo.App. 1975) (quoting Brosius v. Barker, 154 Mo. App. 657,
136 S.W. 18 (1911)).
With respect to being self supporting, a parent is under no obligation to support a child "who is physically and mentally able to take care of his or herself, has voluntarily abandoned the parental roof and turned his back to its protection and influence, and has gone out to fight the battle of life on his own account[.]" Brosius v. Barker, 154 Mo.App. 657, 136 S.W. 18, 20 (1911).
Please see the following MO case:
DOWELL v. DOWELL, 73 S.W.3d 709 (Mo.App.W.D. 2002)
Charles Clifford Dowell, Respondent, v. Crystal Dean Dowell, Appellant.
No. WD 59556.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.
February 19, 2002.
Application for Transfer Denied May 28, 2002.
Appeal From Circuit Court of Morgan County, Hon. Peggy Dean
Richardson.
Page 710
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN
OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.]
Page 711
Carla G. Holste, Jefferson City, for Appellant.
James S. Grantham, Versailles, for Respondent.
Before James M. Smart, JR., Presiding Judge, Harold L.
Lowenstein, Judge and Joseph M. Ellis, Judge.
Joseph M. Ellis, Judge.
Crystal Dean Dowell ("Mother") appeals the trial court's judgment
terminating Charles Clifford Dowell's ("Father") obligation to pay
child support for the parties' daughter, Amber Dowell.
On October 22, 1999, the Circuit Court of Morgan County entered a
judgment dissolving the marriage between Mother and Father. The
dissolution decree granted Mother primary physical custody of the
parties' minor child, Amber Dowell. Father was ordered to pay Mother $338
each month for child support. He was also ordered to pay an additional
$169 per month toward an arrearage of $2,740. On July 19, 2000, Father
filed a motion to modify the dissolution decree, in which he alleged that
Amber was emancipated and prayed that his obligation to pay child support
be terminated. After a hearing, on January 18, 2001, the trial court
formally entered its judgment terminating child support. Mother brings
this appeal.
Amber was born on September 8, 1982. She was 17 years old when the
court entered its dissolution decree. At the time, she had borne a son,
and both she and her son were living with Mother. Sometime in May 2000,
Amber decided to move out of Mother's house. Amber and her son moved in
with Amber's boyfriend and her son's father,[fn1] Josh Reed, at his
apartment. Shortly thereafter, on May 27, 2000, Amber and Mr. Reed signed
a lease for a different apartment and moved into the new premises.
Amber, Mr. Reed and the baby acted and represented themselves as an
independent household. Mr. Reed was employed as a cook at the Rail Fence
Café. Amber stayed home to care for their child. Mr. Reed's income
paid most of the household expenses. However, Amber, on behalf of the
family, applied for and received food stamps. When she applied for the
food stamps, she declared her household to consist of herself, Mr. Reed
and their son. In addition, Amber had previously applied for and was
receiving Medicaid benefits for their son.
Father had no objection to Amber's decision to live on her own. Mother
was opposed to the arrangement but took no action to stop it. Amber
received no support from her parents while she was living with Mr. Reed.
Mother did pay her $20 for cleaning her house once, but did not give her
additional money because she did not want to give Amber the impression
that she supported her living arrangements.
Page 712
On July 19, 2000, after Amber and Mr. Reed had been living together for
approximately two months, Father filed his motion to modify alleging that
Amber was emancipated. Approximately a month later, Amber, her son and
Mr. Reed left the apartment and moved in with Mother because they were
unable to support themselves financially. They were still living with
Mother at the time of trial. Amber was once again attending school as a
high school senior and had applied and been accepted to business
college. She was not working, and Mother stated that she was providing
for all of Amber's living expenses, including her clothes, car
insurance, gas money and necessary car repairs.
The trial court determined that Amber became emancipated from her
parents on June 1, 2000, and that Father's child support obligation ended
on that date. All support that Father paid after June 1, 2000, was
credited toward the arrearage he owed Mother. This appeal follows.
In her only point on appeal, Mother argues the trial court's finding
that Amber became emancipated on June 1, 2000, was not supported by the
evidence. She contends that Amber never became self-supporting. In
addition, Mother claims she did not relinquish parental control by
express or implied consent.
This court will uphold the trial court's judgment unless it is "not
supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the
evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law." Beckwith v.
Giles, 32 S.W.3d 659, 662 (Mo.App.W.D. 2000). The trial court is in the
best position to weigh the evidence, and we should affirm the judgment
"under any reasonable theory supported by the evidence." Id. We view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and defer to the
trial court's determination of witness credibility. Cutting v. Cutting,
39 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Mo.App.W.D. 2001).
"Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the
judgment, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by
emancipation of the child." Section 452.370.4.[fn2] "The purpose of this
statutory provision is to `make it absolute' that unless there are
contrary provisions in the dissolution decree or the separation
agreement, the child support obligation ends upon the child's
emancipation and does not automatically continue during the child's
minority." Ragan v. Ragan, 931 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Mo.App.S.D. 1996)
(quoting Bushell v. Schepp, 613 S.W.2d 689, 691 (Mo.App.E.D. 1981)).
Missouri courts have stated that emancipation occurs when a minor child
is freed from the care, custody, control and service of her parents. Id.
This is generally accomplished when there is a relinquishment of parental
control, the child is given the right to receive and retain her own
earnings, and the parent's legal obligation to support her is
terminated. Id. "Emancipation is never presumed, and the burden is upon
the party asserting it to show facts proving the emancipation." Randolph
v. Randolph, 8 S.W.3d 160, 164 (Mo.App.W.D. 1999). "A minor child may be
emancipated in one of three ways: (1) by express parental consent, (2) by
implied parental consent, or (3) by a change of the child's status in the
eyes of society." Denton v. Sims, 884 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Mo.App.E.D. 1994).
The third category usually refers to a child who has married or joined
the military. Id. "However, it may also be shown when a child who is
physically and mentally able to care for herself voluntarily chooses to
leave the parental home and
Page 713
attempts to `fight the battle of life on [her] own account.'"
Id. (quoting Specking v. Specking, 528 S.W.2d 448,
451 (Mo.App. 1975) (quoting Brosius v. Barker, 154 Mo. App. 657,
136 S.W. 18 (1911)). Indeed, in Brosius v. Barker, the court declared:
[W]e hold that where the child, who is physically
and mentally able to take care of himself, has
voluntarily abandoned the parental roof and turned
his back to its protection and influence, and has
gone out to fight the battle of life on his own
account, the parent is under no obligation to
support him.
136 S.W. at 20. Finally, and consistent with the latter holding, a
child must be old enough to take care of and provide for herself
for emancipation to occur. Randolph, 8 S.W.3d at 164.
Many of these concepts were incorporated into the child support
provisions of the Dissolution of Marriage Act, Chapter 452, with the
Legislative amendment of section 452.340 in 1988, and further amendments
in subsequent years.[fn3] Ragan, 931 S.W.2d at 890. Section 452.340.3
provides:
Unless the circumstances of the child manifestly
dictate otherwise and the court specifically so
provides, the obligation of a parent to make child
support payments shall terminate when the child:
(1) Dies;
(2) Marries;
(3) Enters active duty in the military;
(4) Becomes self-supporting, provided that the
custodial parent has relinquished the child from
parental control by express or implied consent;
(5) Reaches age eighteen, unless the provisions
of subsection 4 or 5 of this section apply; or
(6) Reaches age twenty-two, unless the provisions
of the child support order specifically extend
the parental support order past the child's twenty-second
birthday for reasons provided by subsection 4 of this
section.
In ruling that Amber was emancipated, the trial court stated in its
judgment:
3. Somewhere around the end of May, 2000, Amber Nicole
Dowell chose to leave the parental home of
Respondent, along with her child, and set up residence
with her boyfriend, Josh Reed. Amber testified that it
was her intention t[o] make a home for herself, her
child and boyfriend, and to `fight the battle of life'
on her own. Respondent did not approve of Amber moving
in with her boyfriend, but took no steps to stop her.
4. From the end of May, 2000, until mid-August,
2000, Amber resided with her child and boyfriend,
first in his apartment and then in an apartment
leased by her and Mr. Reed.
5. During this period of time, Amber conducted
herself as an adult in the eyes of society. She and
Mr. Reed leased an apartment. Amber applied for and
received public assistance benefits, declaring her
household to be herself, her child and Mr. Reed.
6. During this same period of time, Amber received
no financial assistance from her parents, except
$20.00 paid to her by Respondent for cleaning
Respondent's home.
7. Sometime around mid-August, 2000, Amber, her
child and Josh Reed moved back into the home of the
Respondent. Amber testified she did this because
financially they weren't able to make it on their
own.
Page 714
8. The Court finds that from the end of May, 2000,
when Amber moved from the Respondent's home that she
was free to make her own decisions concerning herself
and her child, that she was under no parental control
and received no parental support, that she conducted
herself as an adult in the eyes of society, and that
but for the fact that she was having financial
difficulties, she would not have returned to
Respondent's home.
In the instant appeal, Mother focuses exclusively on section 452.340.3.
She reasons that the only provision in that section which arguably could
be applicable to Amber is subsection (4), which provides that child
support terminates if the child "[b]ecomes self-supporting, provided that
the custodial parent has relinquished the child from parental control by
express or implied consent." In doing so, Mother seems to assume that the
only way a child can be emancipated is by virtue of the occurrence of one
or more of the circumstances set forth in section 452.340.3. This
supposition fails to take account of the provision in section 452.370.4,
discussed supra, that generally "provisions for the support of a child
are terminated by emancipation of the child." We note that the word
"emancipation" does not appear in section 452.340.3 and that case law
tells us that child support is terminated by emancipation of the child,
even if section 452.340.3 is inapplicable for some reason. See Randolph,
8 S.W.3d at 163-65. We likewise observe that Father's Motion to Modify
nowhere mentioned section 452.340.3 or any of the provisions thereof, nor
did the trial court's judgment. The motion alleged that Amber was
emancipated, and that is what the trial court found and determined.
Nonetheless, Mother argues that the only way Amber could be declared
emancipated was if section 452.340.3(4) was applicable. She contends that
Amber never became "self-supporting" as required by that statutory
provision, and, therefore, the trial court erred in finding her
emancipated.
Mother's argument is premised on the fact that Amber did not work
outside the home (other than cleaning Mother's house on one occasion)
during the time she, Mr. Reed and the baby were living on their own.
Mother's contention takes a far too narrow view of the phrase
"self-supporting."
In Sparks v. Trantham, 814 S.W.2d 621 (Mo.App.S.D. 1991), one of the
issues was whether a 17-year-old who had completed high school became
emancipated when she moved, with her mother's help, into her own
apartment, despite the fact that she received financial assistance from
her parents and grandparents. Id. at 623. The trial court ruled that the
child was emancipated. Id. at 624. On appeal, the child's mother argued
that the child was not `self-supporting' as required by section
452.340.3(4). Id. at 625. She contended that because the child "accepted
financial and material assistance from her parents and grandparents and
did not earn enough to be totally self-sufficient, the statutory
requirement that she be "self-supporting" [was] not met." Id.
The Southern District of this court rejected the mother's assertion. In
doing so, the court reviewed several cases that considered "the
relationship between a child's emancipation and the degree of financial
and material assistance that child receives from others." Id. Those cases
were Rapplean v. Patterson, 631 S.W.2d 693 (Mo.App.E.D. 1982) (trial
court's finding of emancipation was affirmed where the evidence revealed
that the child slept at his mother's home, occasionally took his meals
there, and there was no insistence by mother that the child pay part of
the household expenses); Black v. Cole, 626 S.W.2d 397 (Mo.App.W.D. 1981)
(appellate
Page 715
court affirmed the trial court's determination that the child
was emancipated where child presumably was living with his mother and
taking his meals at her home without paying for the food or housing); and
In re Marriage of Berkbigler, 560 S.W.2d 36 (Mo.App.E.D. 1977)
(nineteen-year-old attending college four hours per day, and working 20
to 40 hours per week was emancipated, notwithstanding that father
supplied her with a car and that child was not paying mother for room and
board).
Based on its review of these cases, the Sparks court stated:
[W]e conclude it is not inappropriate for a court to
declare a child emancipated even though the child
receives significant financial and other material
support from others, including the custodial parent.
We do not believe the legislature, in amending section
452.340, intended the phrase self-supporting to mean
that a child, to be emancipated, must be totally
self-sufficient and decline all offers of financial
assistance from others, including the custodial
parent.
Sparks, 814 S.W.2d 625-26.
In this case, Amber did not work outside the home. Mr. Reed, however,
had a job outside the home. He worked to make a living for the household
that he and Amber had established, while she remained at the apartment to
care for their child and maintain the household. Amber and Mr. Reed
leased and moved into an apartment together. In addition, Amber applied
for and secured food stamps for the household. She did so in her own
name, and in the application, she declared the household to consist of
herself, Mr. Reed and the baby. She also applied for and was receiving
Medicaid assistance for the baby. It is apparent based on this evidence
that Amber and Mr. Reed were holding themselves out as a most traditional
of family units, notwithstanding the lack of matrimonial bonds.
We agree with the Sparks court that the phrase "self-supporting" in
section 452.340.3(4) does not mean that a child must be totally
self-sufficient and decline all forms of financial assistance. We
likewise conclude that it does not mean that one must work outside of a
traditional family household. Rather, where a couple jointly pursues
independent living, with neither being subject to parental control and
neither receiving parental support, and where one partner works outside
the home to earn a living and the other maintains the household and cares
for their child, both may be considered self-supporting.
Mother next claims that, even if Amber was deemed self-supporting,
there was no relinquishment of parental control by express or implied
consent, as required by section 452.340.3. The record reflects that while
Mother did not approve of Amber moving in with Mr. Reed, Mother
nevertheless took no steps to stop her. In addition, Mother did not
provide Amber with any financial support during the time that Amber, Mr.
Reed and the baby were living on their own, nor did she take any action
to exercise parental control over Amber. "`[A]s a general rule the fact
that a child has entered into a relation which is inconsistent with the
idea of his being in a subordinate situation in his parent's family is
sufficient to effect an emancipation.'" Wurth v. Wurth, 322 S.W.2d 745,
747 (Mo.banc 1959) (quoting Wood v. Wood, 63 A.2d 586, 588 (Conn.
1948)). Emancipation can be implied from a parent's acquiescence to the
child's conduct or circumstances. Id. at 746. Moreover, as discussed
supra, a child can also be considered emancipated when her status
"change[s] in the eyes of society." Randolph, 8 S.W.3d at 164. From the
record before us, there was sufficient evidence for
Page 716
the trial court to determine that Mother impliedly consented to Amber's
emancipation.
As noted previously, Mother's entire argument is premised exclusively
on a lack of evidence to support a finding of emancipation under section
452.340.3(4). But she then tries to rely on our decision in Randolph v.
Randolph, 8 S.W.3d 160 (Mo.App.W.D. 1999), to support her contention. We
find this curious in that we made an express finding in Randolph that
section 452.340.3(4) "manifestly does not apply to Appellant's case, for
the acts by which Appellant claims Vanessa became self-supporting
occurred before Appellant had any obligation to pay child support." Id at
163. Accordingly, we did not analyze whether the custodial parent had
relinquished parental control of the child and whether she had become
self-supporting, but rather we concentrated our analysis on whether the
child had been emancipated based on pertinent case law. Id. at 164-65.
Thus, Randolph is generally irrelevant to Mother's argument in the
instant appeal.
Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that Mother was contending that
there was insufficient evidence to establish that Amber was emancipated
under common law principles, Randolph is distinguishable and would not
compel reversal of the trial court's finding that Amber was emancipated.
In Randolph, seventeen-year-old Vanessa left the parental home after a
family fight. Id. at 163. Both parents tried to prevent her from leaving
and even sought legal assistance in the hope of forcing her to return
home. Id. at 164. Neither parent ever consented to her emancipation
either expressly or by implication. Id. At the time she left, Mother gave
her money with which to live, including motel expenses. Id. at 163.
Vanessa remained away from home for about six months. Id. She and her
boyfriend stayed at a motel the first three or four days, then moved in
with the boyfriend's cousins for approximately three months, and then
they lived with his mother for about six weeks, after which they then
stayed in an apartment for about a month, and then Vanessa moved back
into the family home. Id. During the time she was away, Vanessa had quit
school and worked at several jobs. Id. When she returned home, she was
pregnant and in need of assistance for health insurance. Id.
Subsequently, Father and Mother separated, and in the ensuing dissolution
action, Father argued that Vanessa had become emancipated. Id. The trial
court disagreed, finding that Vanessa was never emancipated. Id. at 163.
On appeal, we affirmed the trial court's judgment. Id. at 165.
It should first be noted that in Randolph the trial court found that
the child was not emancipated, whereas in the instant appeal, the trial
court determined that Amber was emancipated. This distinction is
significant to both cases because of our standard of review which, as
noted previously, requires us to "view the evidence and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment,
`even if there is evidence that would support a different result.'" Kidd
v. Wilson, 50 S.W.3d 858, 862 (Mo.App.W.D. 2001) (quoting Rhodes v. Dir.
of Revenue, 994 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Mo.App.S.D. 1999)). "Indeed, we must
disregard all contrary evidence and permissible inferences that could
have been drawn therefrom." Id.
When the evidence in this case is viewed in that light, Randolph is
clearly distinguishable. In Randolph, we found that the evidence revealed
that "Vanessa's living arrangements . . . were transient, that she
received financial assistance and emotional support from [Mother], and
that she contacted her family on several occasions and asked to return
home." 8 S.W.3d at
Page 717
165. We also found from the evidence that Vanessa's
father had likely prevented her from coming home sooner, that she was
never able to take care of and provide for herself, and that she needed
help from her parents and her mother provided it. Id. Accordingly, we
affirmed the trial court's finding that Vanessa was not emancipated. Id.
In this case, by contrast, the record, when properly viewed, supports
the following findings. Amber chose to leave her parental custodian's
home and set up residence with Mr. Reed. Her intention was to make a home
for herself, her child and Mr. Reed and to "fight the battle of life" on
her own. While not approving, Mother did nothing to stop her or to try to
force her return. Amber did not live as a transient. Very shortly after
her departure, she and Mr. Reed leased an apartment and set up house. She
applied for and received public assistance benefits, declaring her
household to be herself, the baby and Mr. Reed. Amber received no
financial or emotional support from her parents during her absence. Mr.
Reed worked outside the home to financially support the household, while
Amber stayed home to care for the baby, do laundry, clean house and
prepare meals. Indeed, the record amply supports the trial court's finding
that:
[F]rom the end of May, 2000, when Amber moved from the
Respondent's home . . . she was free to make her own
decisions concerning herself and her child, that she
was under no parental control and received no parental
support, that she conducted herself as an adult in the
eyes of society, and that but for the fact that she
was having financial difficulties, she would not have
returned to Respondent's home.
From this review, it is apparent that Randolph, even if Mother had relied
upon its case law analysis, would not compel reversal of the trial court's
judgment in this case. Where there is conflicting evidence, emancipation
is a question of fact to be decided by the fact finder. Wurth, 322 S.W.2d
at 747. While the record before us might have supported a different
result, we cannot say, based on our standard of review, that the trial
court erred in finding that Amber was emancipated.
Accordingly, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
All concur.
This content is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Legal statutes mentioned reflect the law at the time the content was written and may no longer be current. Always verify the latest version of the law before relying on it.